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INTEREST RATES IN EMINENT DOMAIN: IS 6% JUST
COMPENSATION IN A 12% WORLD?
I. INTRODUCTION
Interest rates now run well into double figures.' Yet, the Federal
Declaration of Taking Act' and many state statutes currently provide
for the payment of interest in eminent domain actions at a rate of 6% or
less.' However, the blame for this inequitable situation does not lie
solely with legislative bodies, for the ascertainment of just compensa-
tion, of which interest for delay in payment is an integral part,4 is ulti-
mately a judicial function.' With few exceptions, the courts have either
deferred to the legislatures 6 or been unable to find evidence of sufficient
magnitude to override the statutorily specified rates.'
There is, however, a glimmer of hope for the owner whose property
is taken by an exercise of eminent domain. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that, in certain circumstances, the constitutional re-
quirement of just compensation necessitates the application of an inter-
est rate greater than the 6% rate specified by the Declaration of Taking
1. The prime interest rate on January 10, 1979 was 11.75%. Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1979, at
29, col. 5.
2. 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976) [hereinafter cited variously as the Declaration of Taking Act or
the Act].
3. 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976) provides, in pertinent part: "IThe said judgment shall include,
as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 6 per centum per annum on
the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of taking. . . ." See
3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.63 (rev. 3d ed. 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NICHOLS'], and I. LEVEy, CONDEMNATION IN U.S.A. 1467-1837 (1969) for
surveys of state laws regarding eminent domain procedure, including allowances and rates
of interest.
4. See notes 13-17 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 20-21 infra and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., William v. Denver, 147 Colo. 195, 363 P.2d 171 (1961); Honolulu v. Bonded
Inv. Co., 54 Haw. 385, 507 P.2d 1084, 1090-91 (1973); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Cope-
land, 258 S.C. 206, 188 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1972).
7. See United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973) (holding that the condemnee introduced no evidence at trial to
entitle it to a rate of interest greater than that specified in the Declaration of Taking Act);
Milstar Mfg. Corp. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 351 A.2d 538, 545 (Sup. Jud. Ct.
Me. 1976) (holding that since there had been no challenge to the statutory rate of 6% for 150
years, it was still appropriate); Nassau v. Eveandra Enterprises, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 849, 850, 366
N.E.2d 287, 288, 397 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (1977) (mem.) (holding that the appropriate interest
rate is not measured by fluctuations in the prevailing economic rate and therefore the con-
demnee had failed to show the 6% statutory rate to be unconstitutional).
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Act.' Additionally, the United States Court of Claims has gone a step
further to define the proper rate of delay compensation as being
equivalent to the prevailing interest rate.9 This comment will focus on
the concept of delay compensation and the effect that these federal de-
cisions will have on the law of eminent domain.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution requires that when private property
is taken for public use, the owner must be paid just compensation.' 0
This requirement of just compensation has been extended to the states
by the fourteenth amendment. I Often, either by design or by accident,
the entity exercising the power of eminent domain takes property prior
to paying for it.'2 In such instances, the United States Supreme Court
has held:
Where the United States condemns and takes possession of land before
ascertaining or paying compensation, the owner is not limited to the value
of the property at the time of the taking; he is entitled to such addition as
will produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously
with the taking.' 3
8. United States v. Blankinship, 543 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1976).
9. Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.2d 832, 836 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048
(1978); Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1124 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides in pertinent part, "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."
11. U.S. Co~sT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Conspicuously absent from the due proc-
ess clause is any mention of a just compensation requirement for the taking of private prop-
erty by a state. However, in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
241 (1897), the United States Supreme Court long ago held that when "private property is
taken by the State. . . for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner"
the taking "is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Thus, the Supreme
Court has read a compensation requirement into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See generally Stoebuck, 4 General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WAsH. L.
REV. 553 (1972); Grant, The 'Wigher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
Wisc. L. REv. 67 (1931); Grant, The NaturalLaw Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L,
REV. 56 (1931).
12. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976), which entitles the United States to take title imme-
diately upon the filing of a declaration of taking and to litigate the amount of compensation
owing to the owner at a later date. In cases of inverse condemnation, the unintended taking
occurs and the owner later files suit against the taking entity to recover just compensation
owed to him as a result of the taking. In either instance, taking occurs prior to payment.
13. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923). Accord, Jacobs v.
United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1933); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 344 (1927).
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Thus, the owner is entitled to additional compensation for the delay
between taking and payment.
Over the years, courts have adopted various theories for paying addi-
tional compensation for the delay. Some have viewed the additional
amount as compensation for loss of use of the property. 4 The better
view is that, as the owner is entitled to payment contemporaneously
with the taking, he is compensated not for loss of use of the property,
for it is really no longer his, but for the loss of use of the money owed to
him at the moment of the taking. 5 The owner is then to be compen-
sated for his loss of use of the money owed him and "[i]nterest at a
proper rate 'is a good measure by which to ascertain the amount so to
be added'.""6
Thus, interest at a proper rate to compensate for the delay in pay-
ment constitutes an element of just compensation.' 7 As such, interest
or some other form of delay compensation is constitutionally required
when property is taken by the exercise of eminent domain prior to pay-
ment.18
Because just compensation is a constitutional requirement,19 the rate
of interest to be paid as delay compensation is ultimately a matter for
judicial determination.20 Therefore, the right to receive interest as a
part of just compensation is not dependent on statutory authorization.2'
14. See Jackson County v. Hesterberg, 519 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Mo. App. 1975) (quoting
Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Hamlin, 288 S.W. 2d 14, 17 (Mo. App. 1956)).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Blankinship, 543 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1976), and au-
thorities cited therein. The Blankinsho court stated: "[Hie who pays $1.00 tomorrow to
discharge a debt of $1.00 due and payable today, pays less than he owes." Id
16. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 17 (1933) (citing Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923)).
17. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 17 (1933).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1976) provides that "[i]nterest on a claim against the United
States shall be allowed. . . only under a contract or Act of Congress expressly providing for
payment thereof." The Supreme Court, in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341
U.S. 48, 49 (1951) (per curiam), held that the only exception to the rule of sovereign immu-
nity from the payment of interest "arises when the taking entitles the claimant to just com-
pensation under the Fifth Amendment. Only in such cases does the award of compensation
include interest."
19. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
20. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893), cited in
United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 822 (1973). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 49, 70 (1803) ("It is em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
21. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937), in which the Court
stated: "[T]he fact is unimportant, there having been an appropriation of property within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, that the jurisdictional act is silent as to an award of
interest or any substitute therefor." See, e.g., cases cited in 3 NICHOLS', supra note 3, § 8.63
at 167-68 & n.18. Contra, Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Copeland, 258 S.C. 206, 188
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However, Congress, along with many state legislatures, has promul-
gated statutes governing eminent domain procedures. Many of these
statutes allow for interest at specified rates.22 But as noted above, just
,compensation is not dependent on legislative will and, therefore, the
courts are not bound by these statutory interest rates.
Eminent domain takings occur in many forms, all of which require
the payment of just compensation. 23 Therefore, the right to just com-
pensation, including interest on delayed payments, accrues whether the
taking occurs pursuant to inverse condemnation, patent infringement,
24
statute, or judicial procedure.26 As the right to payment occurs con-
temporaneously with the actual taking,27 the date of the taking deter-
mines when delay compensation starts to accrue. Different
jurisdictions have established various methods for determining the date
of taking.28 In addition, the date of the taking differs depending on the
type of taking actually employed.
Many statutory schemes allow the condemnor to take title automati-
cally and to enter into possession before final judment.29 Under such
schemes, the condemnor files a declaration of taking and pays the esli-
S.E.2d 188, 194 (1972) (quoting South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Southern Ry. Co.,
239 S.C. 1, 121 S.E.2d 236 (1961)) (" 'The amount ofjust compensation to be paid can only
be determined under the provisions of an act of the Legislature.....
22. See note 3 supra.
23. The United States Constitution demands that just compensation be paid for private
property taken for public use. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. However, no distinction is made
between the various procedures by which takings occur.
24. See Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 509 (1931). For the history of the develop-
ment of the concept of delay compensation in inverse condemnation and patent infringe-
ment cases, see Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 353-55 (Ct. Cl.) (Bennett, J.,
concurring), modoed, 557 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1977), subsequently appealedfrom trial court
disposition, 575 F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978) and authorities cited
therein.
25. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 381 (1943); United States v. Blankinship,
543 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1976).
26. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937).
27. Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341, 344 (1927).
28. See 3 NICHOLS', supra note 3, § 8.63[1] and authorities cited therein for a survey of
the various methods used for determining when a taking has occurred.
29. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976), which provides, in part:
Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the deposit in the court, to the use of
the persons entitled thereto, of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in said
declaration, title to the said lands in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest
therein as is specified in said declaration, shall vest in the United States of America, and
said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the United States,
and the right to just compensation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto;
and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in said proceeding and estab-
lished by judgment therein. ...
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mated value of the property into court.3 ° Most jurisdictions allow the
owner to withdraw the amount deposited while awaiting a final adjudi-
cation of the condemnor's right to take and a determination of the ex-
act amount of compensation due.3' If the owner has the right to
withdraw the funds, the right to interest on the amount deposited
ceases.32 However, the owner's right to interest still accrues on the dif-
ference between the final award and the deposit.33 The owner is not
allowed interest on the amount deposited, which he may withdraw, be-
cause he has the use of that portion of his compensation. Therefore,
the rationale of paying interest to compensate the owner for the loss of
use of his money no longer applies.
The Federal Declaration of Taking Act34 is representative of the stat-
utory schemes that allow the condemnor to take title and possession
immediately upon filing a declaration of taking and depositing with the
court the amount of estimated compensation owed to the owner .3  The
Act was signed into law on February 26, 1931 during the height of the
depression. The purpose of the Act was to expedite the taking of prop-
erty for public works in order to create jobs and to help relieve the
major unemployment problem that beseiged the United States.36 How-
ever, the House of Representatives debate with respect to the Act indi-
cates that it was "not strictly an emergency measure." Rather, it was to
be considered a "permanent feature of the law."
37
In developing this legislation, Congress was acutely aware that the
issue of determining just compensation was within the province of the
30. Id
31. But see Redevelopment Agency v. Goodman, 53 Cal. App. 3d 424, 431-35, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 818, 821-24 (1975), in which the court held that, if the condemnee appeals the con-
demnor's right to take, he may neither withdraw the fund from the court nor obtain legal
interest on the fund. The condemnee is, however, entitled to the interest actually earned by
the fund while it remains in the custody of the court. Contra, Locasio v. Rosewell, 50 I1.
App. 3d 704, 365 N.E.2d 949, 953 (1977) ("interest earned is to be deposited into the county
corporate fund"). With the legal rate of interest at 7% in California, it is quite possible that
the condemnee who challenges the condemnor's right to take, will receive a greater interest
award'than the condemnee who fails to challenge and receives the legal rate.
32. With regard to the final award ofjust compensation, 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976) provides
that "interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into the
court." But see State v. Reuter 352 N.E.2d 806, 808 (Ind. 1976), where interest was allowed
on the fund deposited into court because the condernee would have been constrained by
rigid surety procedures had he withdrawn the fund.
33. See cases cited notes 24-26 supra.
34. 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976).
35. See note 29 supra.
36. H.R. REP. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1930); S. REP. No. 1325, 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. 1 (1931).
37. 74 CONG. REC. 777, 779 (1930).
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judiciary.38 Why, then, did Congress establish a specific 6% rate of in-
terest to be paid in takings pursuant to the Act?39 The Act was in-
tended to impose no hardship on the owners of property condemned by
the United States,4" for the owner was to receive "interest at the usual
rate."" Although the 6% rate of interest specified by the Act was con-
siderably higher than money market rates in 1930,42 it was consistent
with the rate of interest allowed by the Court of Claims in other types
of eminent domain proceedings.43 The statutes granting jurisdiction to
the Court of Claims to adjudicate inverse condemnation 44 and patent
infringement45 eminent domain cases did not specify an interest rate.
Thus, it appears that the 6% rate of interest adopted by the Court of
Claims was judicialy created.46 Therefore, Congress was merely codi-
fying the existing judically created rate of delay compensation in the
Declaration of Taking Act.
In applying the Declaration of Taking Act, the federal courts viewed
the 6% statutory rate as presumptively just compensatioh .
47 Similarly,
most state courts have held that there is a presumption that the statuto-
rily specified rate meets the state and federal constitutional require-
38. See H.R. REP. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1930). in which the House Committee
on the Judiciary stated:
Operation under this measure will result in no hardship on the owners of property
taken by the Government. Their rights are amply protected thereunder. By this bill it
is sought merely to provide a means whereby the Government may take title immedi-
ately, and leave the amount fcompensation to be determined by the court according to the
usualprocedure. (emphasis added).
39. The Act provides for the payment of interest as follows:
[T]he said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at
the rate of 6 per centum per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the
property as of the day of taking, from said date to the date of payment; but interest shall
not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into the court.
40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976).
40. See note 38 supra.
41. 74 CONG. REC. 777, 779 (1930).
42. In 1930, the prime interest rate was 3.50%, dropping to 2.75% in 1931. 1 J. FINANCIAL
PLAN. 91 (1977). The yield on 90 day Treasury bills was 2.494% per annun in 1930 and
1.402% per annum in 1931. U.S. DEPT. COM., BUs. STATISTICS 86 (biennial ed. 1959). The
United States did not sell longer term Treasury bonds until 1942. Corporate bond yields
averaged 5.09% annually in 1930 and 5.81% in 1931. U.S. DEP'T COM., Bus. STATISTICS 101
(biennial ed. 1959).
43. See Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1120 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). See notes 119-20 infra and accompanying text.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1976). See note 121 infra and accompanying text.
46. See generalo Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1120-24 (Ct. CI. 1976) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
47. See United States v. 40,379 Square Feet of Land, 58 F. Supp. 246, 251 (D. Mass.
1944); 3 NICHOLS', supra note 3, § 8.63[3] at 362.
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ments of adequate delay compensation. 48 At the same time, the courts
have overwhelmingly recognized that, because just compensation is a
judicial decision, the presumption that statutory rates are constitutional
may be rebutted by sufficient evidence of a more reasonable rate.49
Both state and federal courts, however, have been reluctant to find evi-
dence sufficient to override the applicable statutory rate."
Until 1976, the 6% interest rate specified by the Act had successfully
withstood challenge in cases in which the taking strictly followed the
procedures set forth therein. However, in cases in which the taking
deviated from the statutory procedure, the courts were more willing to
authorize the payment of a different interest rate. For example, in
United States v. 412.715 Acres of Land,5' the United States had taken
possession of the owner's land in 1942 but had not filed a declaration of
taking until 1945. The court found that the taking had occurred in
1942, but that, under the Act, legal title had not passed to the United
States until it had filed the declaration of taking in 1945.52 Until legal
title had passed to the Government in 1945, taxes continued to be as-
sessed and became liens against the land.
After the Government filed a declaration of taking and paid a fund
into the court to cover the market value of the land, it then acquired
title free and clear of all encumbrances. 3 The liens, which had been
created by the Government's failure to file a declaration of taking
promptly, attached to the fund. The result was that the owner was re-
quired to pay the liens out of his compensation. The court recognized
that, in condemnation proceedings not governed by the Act, the United
States often pays delay compensation based upon the legal rate of in-
terest of the state in which the land is located.54 In 412.715 Acres of
Land, the land was located in California, which had a legal rate of
interest of 7%. Exercising his judicial discretion to fix the rate of delay
compensation, the trial judge awarded the owner 7% interest on the
48. See note 6 supra.
49. See generally United States v. Blankinship, 543 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. 412.715 Acres of Land, 60 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1945); In re Washington
Heights, 82 Misc. 2d 557, 369 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). But see Carolina Power &
Light Co. v. Copeland, 258 S.C. 206, 188 S.E.2d 188 (1972).
50. See note 7 supra.
51. 60 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
52. Id at 577.
53. Id
54. Id at 578. Accord, United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land, 47 F. Supp.
30, 33 (S.D. Ga. 1942) (holding that, in cases in which the Declaration of Taking Act is not
invoked, federal courts are usually constrained to apply the local rate of legal interest as
delay compensation).
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L,4W REVIEW
jury's compensation award to cover the time period between the 1942
date of taking and the 1945 date on which the Government filed a dec-
laration of taking and deposited a fund into court.55 The additional 1%
interest was designed to compensate the owner for the tax liability cre-
ated by the failure of the Government to file a declaration of taking. 6
To support his decision that the California legal rate of interest
should be paid as delay compensation in 412.715 Acres of Land, the
trial judge relied on an earlier district court decision from Georgia,
United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land.7 That case in-
volved a taking by the United States that did not fall within the juris-
diction of the Act. The trial judge awarded the owner delay
compensation at the 7% legal rate utilized in Georgia.5 However, the
judge also stated: "If some more satisfactory guide than local law is
available and is supplied, the courts may use that, i.e., the current inter-
est rates or other satisfactory evidence as to a 'reasonable rate of inter-
est' . . . , but none has been furnished here."5 9
In 412.715 Acres ofLand, the owner specifically asked for the Cali-
fornia legal rate of 7% interest. The issue of the prevailing, or money
market, rate of interest as delay compensation was not raised.60 Simi-
larly, in A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land, no evidence of prevailing
interest rates was introduced. At the time of these cases, the 6% and 7%
rates of delay compensation were substantially greater than the money
market interest rates.6'
In 1972, an owner of property taken pursuant to the Declaration of
Taking Act appealed the lower court's application of a 6% interest rate
in United States v. 100 Acres of Land.62 Drake's Beach (the owner)
argued that the 6% rate authorized by the Act was not a reasonable rate
of interest because it was not the current prevailing economic rate and,
therefore, would not fully compensate him for the delay in payment.63
55. 60 F. Supp. at 578.
56. Id
57. 47 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Ga. 1942).
58. Id at 32.
59. Id at 33.
60. 60 F. Supp. at 577.
61. During 1933-1947, a period encompassing both ,4 Certain Tract or Parcel ofLand and
412715 4cres of Land, the prime interest rate was only 1.50% per annum. I J. FINANCIAL
PLAN. 91 (1977). Corporate bond yields were equally low; the average annual yield was
3.34% in 1942 and 2.87% in 1945. U.S. DEP'T COM., BUs. STATISTICS 101 (biennial ed.
1959). United States Treasury bonds yielded even less: 2.46% annually in 1942, 2.37% in
1945. Id at 102.
62. 468 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822, 864 (1973).
63. Id at 1268.
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The Ninth Circuit never really decided this issue. Still, the court prop-
erly held that interest, as a part of just compensation, was to be deter-
mined by the judicial process. 64 The question therefore became
"whether interest is a question of law to be decided by the court, or...
a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact."'65 The court
held that, given the many variables affecting interest rates in each fac-
tual situation, the issue of interest as delay compensation was a factual
question to be determined by the trier of fact.66
The record showed that Drake's Beach had not introduced any evi-
dence regarding interest during the valuation trial and thus, the court
concluded, the question had never properly been placed before the
jury.67 The court further held that by failing to make the interest ques-
tion an issue at the trial, Drake's Beach had waived its opportunity to
do so and, therefore, was not entitled to another trial.68
The 100 Acres of Land case brings into focus the fact that, while
interest rates in the money market have undergone changes since the
promulgation of the Declaration of Taking Act in 1931, the 6% interest
rate specified therein has remained unchanged. In 1931, the prime in-
terest rate was 2.75%.69 By the time the 100 Acres of Land case came to
trial in 1969, the prime rate had risen to 8.5%.70 Similarly, Moody's
Average Yield for Corporate Domestic Bonds had risen from 5.81% in
1931 to 7.36% in 1969.71 Furthermore, the United States Government,
the most secure debtor in the country, was paying 6.85% interest on its
three- to five-year bonds.72
By the mid-1970's, interest rates were experiencing drastic fluctua-
tions. The prime rate soared to a high of 12% in July 1974.13 One year
later, it had declined to 6.75%.14 Bond yields also rose greatly. The
average yield on long term corporate bonds was 9.03% in 1974 and
64. Id at 1268-69 (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
327 (1893)).
65. Id. at 1269.
66. Id See, e.g., United States v. Blankinship, 543 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1976).
67. 468 F.2d at 1269-70. The Ninth Circuit found that Drake's Beach did not raise the
issue of interest until after the jury had awarded just compensation. See Confederated Sa-
lish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States, 437 F.2d 458, 460 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
68. 468 F.2d at 1270.
69. See note 42 supra.
70. 1 J. FINANCIAL PLAN. 91 (1977).
71. U.S. DEP'T COM., Bus. STATISTICS 101 (biennial ed. 1959); U.S. DEP'T COM., Bus.
STATISTICS 105 (21st biennial ed. 1977).
72. U.S. DEP'T COM., Bus. STATISTICS 256 (21st biennial ed. 1977).
73. 1 J. FINANCIAL PLAN. 93 (1977).
74. Id.
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climbed to a high of 9.57% in 1975.75 United States government bonds
were also on the rise. Three- to five-year bonds were yielding an aver-
age of 7.8 1% in 1974.76 By 1975, this figure was marginally reduced to
7.55%.77 Meanwhile, the courts continued to apply the 6% statutory
rate.78
III. UNITED STATES V. BLANKINSHIP
7 9
A. Facts and Analysis
In 1976, the Ninth Circuit was confronted directly with the interest
rate issue that it had failed to resolve four years earlier in 100 Acres of
Land. In United States v. Blankinshov, s° the court held that "the Fifth
Amendment under certain circumstances does require the use of a rate
of interest in excess of 6 percent."'" After it reviewed the long line of
cases that had held delay compensation to be a judicial issue, the court
reached the following conclusion:
[T]he 6 percent figure employed by Congress in the Declaration of Taking
Act cannot be viewed as a ceiling on the rate of interest allowable in com-
puting just compensation with respect to a deficiency. It will, of course,
operate as afloor. No lesser rate than 6 percent is consistent with the
intent of Congress; a rate no greater than 6 percent in some instances will
contravene the Fifth Amendment.
82
The Blankinshop case involved the taking of several parcels of land in
May 1973 pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act. Two of these
parcels, the Wilson parcel and the Double-O-Bar parcel, were severely
undervalued by the United States. As a result, the amount deposited
into the court as the estimated value of each of these properties was
greatly deficient. Consequently, in the Wilson and Double-O-Bar
75. U.S. DEP'T COM., Bus. STATISTICS 105 (21st biennial ed. 1977).
76. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANN. STATISTICAL Dia.
1971-1975, at 121 (1976).
77. Id
78. See Milstar Mfg. Corp. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 351 A.2d 538, 545 (Sup.
Jud. Ct. Me. 1976); Nassau v. Eveandra Enterprises, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 849, 850, 366 N.E. 2d
287, 288, 397 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (1977) (mem.). Holding the 7% statutory rate of Louisiana
to be sufficient, the district court for the Western District of Louisiana stated: "Interest at
the rate of 7%. . .is fair and reasonable, as is the statutory rate of legal interest in Louisi-
ana, especially at times when the prime rate of interest in this country. . . is in the nine to
ten percent (9% to 10%) range, or higher." United States v. 71.29 Acres of Land, 376 F.
Supp. 1221, 1226 (W.D. La. 1974).
79. 543 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1976).
80. Ad.
81. Id at 1274.
82. Id at 1276 (emphasis added).
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cases, both juries found that the owners were entitled to almost double
the amounts deposited by the United States. In Double-O-Bar, the de-
ficiency was more than $450,000. In Wilson, the deficient amount was
in excess of $1,400,000.3
After the jury verdicts in the respective cases, the trial judge held
additional hearings to determine the rate of interest to be paid on the
deficient amounts.84 Rather than automatically using the 6% rate spec-
ified by the Declaration of Taking Act, the trial judge considered evi-
dence of other measures of delay compensation, such as, the prime
interest rate, rates of interest paid on certificates of deposit by local
banks, and the yield on short term Treasury bills.8
In the Double-O-Bar case, the delay compensation hearing was held
in December 1974. The trial judge, considering the aforementioned
factors, fixed the interest rate at 8.5%.16 The interest rate to be paid on
the Wilson deficiency was determined to be 8%,87 reflecting these same
economic factors as they existed in May 1975. After depositing the de-
ficient amounts with interest at 6% in October 1975, the United States
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, contending that the trial court should
have employed the 6% rate specified by the Declaration of Taking Act
in both cases.88 These appeals were consolidated in United States v.
Blankinship.
After holding that the trial court was not bound by the 6% rate of
interest specified by the Declaration of Taking Act,89 the Ninth Circuit
was faced with a more difficult task. The court had yet to determine
the following questions: (1) under what circumstances is a rate greater
than 6% required? and (2) in what manner are such circumstances es-
83. Id at 1274.
84. Id This is apparently an innovation by the trial judge. In the Ninth Circuit's earlier
decision of United States v. 100 Acres of Land, 468 F.2d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822, 864 (1973), the court ruled that the determination of interest was an
issue of fact to be determined by the jury. As in 10,4cres ofLand, the issue of interest was
not presented to the jury in Blankinsh. Rather, the trial judge in Blankinshop held an
additional hearing to determine interest, at which he acted as the trier of fact.
85. 543 F.2d at 1274-75. However, neither this opinion nor the opinion of the trial judge
on remand, United States v. Blankinship, 431 F. Supp. 403 (D. Or. 1977), indicates the
relative weight assigned to each instrument by the trial judge in arriving at his award of
delay compensation.
86. 543 F.2d at 1275.
87. Id
88. Id at 1274. The United states contended that the 6% rate specified by the Declaration
of Taking Act was "applicable to each taking pursuant thereto without regard to then pre-
vailing interest rates." Id
89. Id
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tablished?9 ° Furthermore, implicit in these questions is the additional
issue of which measures should be used to determine the proper rate of
delay compensation if the 6% rate is not applicable.
To these questions, the Ninth Circuit gave a less than conclusive an-
swer. The court first held that the "determination of whether a proper
and rdasonable rate in excess of 6 percent is required and the amount
of such rate is a factual question and should be determined by the trier
of fact."'" The court then reversed the 8% and 8.5% interest rates
awarded by the trial judge because he had failed to consider evidence
that the court considered to be of great importance in determining the
proper rate of delay compensation. 92 The court was convinced that the
United States customarily pays a lower interest rate on its obligations
than other borrowers pay. The court was of the opinion that the evi-
dence considered by the trial judge did not adequately make this dis-
tinction, even though the judge did consider the yield of 90- to 180-day
Treasury notes in determining delay compensation.
93
The Ninth Circuit equated the seizing of land by the United States
pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act to the substitution of a risk-
free obligation of the United States in exchange for the owner's land.94
This "obligation" began to accrue as of the date of taking and "ma-
tured" on the date the United States deposited the deficiency, plus
proper interest, into the court. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit believed
the Government's obligation to be more like a Treasury note with a
relative maturation date than an accumulation of yields on 90- to 180-
day Treasury bills.95
The Blankinshio court was concerned that using the prime rate and
rates of certificates of deposit to determine delay compensation would
result in distortion. This is because these rates are more reflective of
the general commercial rate of interest than of the interest rate paid by
90. Id
9 1. Id However, the court made no mention of the fact that, at the trial level, the deter-
mination of the applicable interest rate was made by the judge as the trier of fact, and not by
the jury.
92. 543 F.2d at 1274.
93. Id at 1274-75, 1276.
94. Id at 1276.
95. Id However, the dissent took issue with the analysis of the majority that, in taking
land under the Declaration of Taking Act, the United States substitutes an obligation of the
United States that is free from the risk of default. Judge Kilkenny stated: "This analysis is
fundamentally unsound: What the United States substitutes for the ownership of land is its
obligation to pay the owner jut compensation for the property taken. Undue emphasis, as
here, upon the monetary returns from obligations of the United States Treasury is not war-
ranted." Id at 1277 (Kilkenny, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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the United States on its risk-free obligations.96 The court stated that
the use of short term Treasury bill yields would not counter these dis-
tortions as effectively as would the use of the yield on a Treasury note
having the same duration as the period between taking and final pay-
ment.97 It is interesting to note that the average yield on 90-day Treas-
ury bills from May 1973 to May 1975 was 7.07%, while 180-day bills
had an average yield of 7.45% during the same period.98 The Treasury
notes of the desired duration actually considered by the district court
on remand yielded either 6.78% or 6.92%.99 The difference between the
yields on short and long term bonds is incredibly small.
The court also noted that the trier of fact is not inexorably bound by
Treasury note yields alone in fixing the proper amount of delay com-
pensation. The Ninth Circuit realized that a claim for just compensa-
tion held by an owner of condemned land is not nearly as marketable
as an actual Treasury security of the United States. Therefore, the
court stated that allowing for this feature in fixing delay compensation
would not be unreasonable.I°°
The Ninth Circuit was aware that a consideration of longer term
notes might be inconsequential.' 0 ' As an appellate rather than a fact-
finding body, the court merely wished to emphasize that the obligation
owed to the condemnee was one owed by the United States Govern-
ment and that interest on that obligation should be ascertained, there-
fore, with a view to the special characteristics of the United States as a
debtor. As a result of the failure of the district court judge to consider
the longer term Treasury notes, the Blankinship court did not have to
rule on the constitutionality of the application of the 6% rate specified
by the Declaration of Taking Act to the facts of the cases before it.
However, the court did state that it "strongly" suspected that the use of
the 6% rate under these facts was indeed barred by the fifth amend-
ment.1
0 2
On remand, "in light of all indices in the record," the trial judge
assumed that 6% was an inadequate rate. 103 He then proceeded to fix
96. Id at 1276.
97. Id
98. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANN. STATISTICAL DIG.
1971-1975, at 121 (1976).
99. United States v. Blankinship, 431 F. Supp. 403, 404 (D. Or. 1977).
100. 543 F.2d at 1277.
101. Id at 1276.
102. Id
103. 431 F. Supp. at 404. Apparently, the trial judge interpreted the disparity between the
money market rate for the sum of the indicators he considered and the 6% rate specified by
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the rate of delay compensation in accordance with the Ninth Circuit
opinion. But he gave the appellate court opinion as narrow an inter-
pretation as possible. The judge read the opinion as merely requiring
him "to consider rates of longer term Treasury bonds, along with rates
of the other types of obligations used earlier."' 10 4 In recomputing the
delay compensation awards after considering the Treasury note rates,
the trial judge lowered his original interest rates by 0.75%. The ad-
justed interest rate awarded to Double-O-Bar was 7.75%, while the rate
in the Wilson taking was 7.25%.105
In October 1975, the United States had deposited 6% interest along
with the difference between the original deposit and the jury award.
This left the United States owing 1.75% and 1.25% interest in the re-
spective cases from the date of taking in 1973 until October 1975.
However, due to the pendency of the appeal, the owners did not receive
their additional delay compensation on that date.10 6 As a result, the
trial judge awarded an additional 6% post-judgment interest on the
1.25% and 1.75% delay compensation still owing; such interest was to
run from October 1975 until final payment. 7 As the delay compensa-
tion constituted a part of the award of just compensation, the allowance
of the additional 6% interest did not constitute an impermissible com-
pounding of interest; rather, it was post-judgment interest on the award
of just compensation improperly withheld since October 1975.108
B. Sign4canl Holdings
1. The 6% rate of interest is a floor, not a ceiling, in computing
delay compensation.
In Blankinship the Ninth Circuit interpreted the 6% figure as being
the lowest rate at which interest could be assessed under the Declara-
tion of Taking Act. At the same time, the court indicated that the facts
of a particular case might necessitate payment of a higher rate of inter-
the Declaration of Taking Act as evidence of the fact that the statutory rate would not satisfy
the fifth amendment requirement of just compensation.
104. Id. (emphasis in original). In Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978), the Court of Claims, in its analysis of
BlankinshOp, stated: "The Court of Appeals held that the trier had to consider and take into
account such short-term actual Government obligations (not that the trier was bound by
those rates)." Id at 1122 n.18 (emphasis in original).
105. 431 F. Supp. at 404.
106. Id
107. Id at 404-05.
108. Id
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est. 10 9 The statement by the Ninth Circuit that the 6% rate specified by
the Act is not a "ceiling" on interest rates payable in takings pursuant
to the Act is fully in accord with the established principle that the de-
termination of just compensation is a judicial rather than a legislative
function. 0 The decision is significant because it marks the first time
that a federal court has construed the fifth amendment's just compensa-
tion requirement to include the payment of interest at a rate greater
than 6%.
2. The applicable money market interest rates are determinative of
whether the fifth amendment requires the payment of more
than 6%.
Although the Blankinship court expressly held that the determination
of whether a rate of delay compensation in excess of 6% is required is a
question of fact," I I implicit in the court's discussion was the assumption
that money market rates provide the most equitable basis for that de-
termination. This is evidenced by the court's own comparison of the
statutory rate of 6% to current money market interest rates. The court
noted that the trial court should have focused on the yield on Treasury
bonds to effectuate an appropriate comparison. Although leaving the
final determination to the trial court, the Ninth Circuit implied that 6%
is an inadequate rate of interest whenever the United States Govern-
ment is paying more than 6% interest to borrow money.
This reasoning is basically consistent with the argument put forth by
the condemnee in United States v. 100 Acres of Land,"2 namely, that
the current prevailing economic rate is determinative of just delay com-
pensation. Although the trial court in Blankinshio applied the prevail-
ing economic rate by considering the interest rates on several different
types of instruments, the Ninth Circuit modified that standard by sup-
plementing the analysis with an emphasis on the interest rates of
United States Treasury notes.
The concept of prevailing economic rates as determinative of delay
compensation, whether modified by the Ninth Circuit or not, is fully in
accord with the general principle of determining just compensation in
109. 543 F.2d at 1276.
110. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation fully comports with the intent of the
framers of the Act to allow for the payment of interest at "the usual rate." See note 41 supra
and accompanying text. However, the court did not attempt to reconcile its decision with
legislative intent, although this authority was available.
111. 543 F.2d at 1274.
112. 468 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822, 864 (1973). See notes 62-63
supra and accompanying text.
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eminent domain takings. Where equitable to both condemnor and
condemnee, just compensation has been determined historically by
market value." 3 Market or "fair market" value is defined as the price
that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller." 4 The prevailing
interest rate on a money market instrument (e.g., a United States
Treasury note) is, in actuality, the price paid by a willing borrower to a
willing lender for the use of money. Therefore, it follows from the
Blankinsh#p opinion that, just as the Government must pay fair market
value as just compensation for the property it takes, it must also pay
fair market value to the owner for the delay in receiving his compensa-
tion. This fair market value, as defined by the Blankinshop court, is
determined by what the United States Government pays on the open
market for the money it borrows.
3. The use of United States Treasury notes by the Blankinshiv court
shows calculation of delay compensation from the point of
view of the condemnor.
With few exceptions, it is a well-established principle of the law of
eminent domain that just compensation is determined from the point of
view of the condemnee, not the condemnor.' 5 In Blankinship, the
Ninth Circuit violated this principle by emphasizing the use of United
States Treasury instruments to determine delay compensation. The in-
terest rates on government bonds represent the cost to the United States
of borrowing money, not the cost to the condemnee of borrowing the
same amount of money for the same period of time. The cost to the
United States of borrowing money is considerably less than the cost to
the average condemnee. If the owners in Blankinship had borrowed an
amount equivalent to their compensation awards for the period during
which payment was delayed, their interest payments would have been
greatly in excess of interest rates paid by the United States on Treasury
instruments."16 If just compensation is to be calculated with an eye to
113. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
(1973). The same day the Court decided A/mola Farmers, it decided United States v. Fuller,
409 U.S. 488 (1973). In Fuller, the Court stated that fair market value "is 'not an absolute
standard nor an exclusive method of valuation'." d at 490 (quoting United States v. Vir-
ginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961)).
114. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
(1973).
115. See Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910); 3
NICHOLS', supra note 3,_§ 8.61 and cases cited therein.
116. As noted by the trial judge in Blankinshop, the Government paid either 6.78% or
6.92% on its bonds during the period of delay in Blankinshio. The prime interest rate during
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the loss suffered by the condemnee, then interest rates payable by the
United States are not relevant to the calculations.
In condemnation takings involving a sovereign other than the United
States, basing an award upon the credit rating of the condemnor can
work inequity on the sovereign. One need look no further than the
recent financial problems that have plagued such major American cit-
ies as Cleveland and New York to see that this theory, if applied to
takings by those cities, would result in the payment of delay compensa-
tion far in excess of that required by the fourteenth amendment.
17
A measure of compensation based upon the actual cost to a particu-
lar condemnee of borrowing money is equally unsatisfactory. Even
though just compensation traditionally has been determined by what
the condemnee has lost and not by what the taker has gained, it would
be inequitable to require the condemnor to indemnify an insolvent con-
demnee. If the court were to look to the property owner's credit rating
in assessing delay compensation, a poor credit risk would receive a
greater interest rate than a good credit risk who owned the same prop-
erty!
By instructing the trial judge to consider the interest rate paid by the
United States on its Treasury bonds, the Blankinshio court failed to
consider any of the above-mentioned policy considerations. However,
these distinctions have received considerable discussion in post-
Blankinshio eminent domain cases heard by the United States Court of
Claims.' 18
IV. INTEREST RATES IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS
The United States Court of Claims has jurisdiction, pursuant to the
Tucker Act,' 19 over suits against the United States for uncompensated
takings by inverse condemnation, which claims are constitutionally
based. 2° The Patent Infringement Act also grants jurisdiction to the
this period ranged from 6.75% to 12%, averaging approximately 9.25%. 1 J. FINANCIAL
PLAN. 93 (1977).
117. See note 11 supra. See also Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1979, at 15, col. 1: "The bond market
denied access to a few prospective issues last year. It refused to readmit New York City.
. . . Its door slammed closed to Cleveland, which. . . became the first large U.S. metropolis
to default in about 45 years."
118. See Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1122-24 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
120. The Tucker Act states in pertinent part: "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdic-
tion to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded ... upon the
Constitution . . . ." Id A suit by an owner whose property has been taken by inverse
condemnation by the United States is a claim founded upon the Constitution and is, there-
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Court of Claims to hear suits against the United States for patent and
copyright infringement.' 2' Such infringement constitutes a taking of a
property right protected by the fifth amendment, 22 thus entitling the
owner of the patent or copyright to "reasonable and entire compensa-
tion."'
1 23
As both the Tucker Act and the Patent Infringement Act apply to
takings that require just compensation, the owners of property taken by
inverse condemnation or patent infringement are entitled to delay com-
pensation for the period between the taking and final payment. Both
inverse condemnation and patent infringement, by their very defini-
tions, involve cases in which payment is never contemporaneous with
the taking. In such cases, the delay between taking and payment may
literally span decades. 124 Consequently, delay compensation often be-
comes a major part of the entire award of just compensation. 25
Unlike the Declaration of Taking Act, neither the Tucker Act nor the
Patent Infringement Act specifies a particular interest rate to be paid as
delay compensation. Thus, the Court of Claims has been faced with
the task of determining a viable standard for fixing interest rates for
delay compensation. For the first half of the century, the court gener-
ally followed trends in investment yield rates. 126 The court historically
has employed the same rate in all eminent domain cases, whether pur-
suant to the Tucker Act or the Patent Infringement Act.
2 7
The interest rate employed by the Court of Claims from 1927 to 1937
fore, within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 125-27 (1974) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946)).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1976).
122. See generally Crozier v. Krupp. 224 U.S. 290 (1912).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1976) provides for recovery of "reasonable and entire compensa-
tion," which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include interest for the delay in
payment. See Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 509 (1931).
124. In Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1051 (1978), the taking occurred in 1946 and final judgment was not reached until
1977. The Government had not paid for the taking for over thirty years!
125. See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl.), cer. denied, 439 U.S.
1048 (1978). In Tektronix, the Court of Claims found the condemnee to be entitled to inter-
est of $1,995,087, plus $491.66 per day, until payment was made on a just compensation
award of $2,243,220. Id at 836-38. The delay compensation almost equalled the original
award.
126. For a history of delay compensation treatment in the Court of Claims, see Pitcairn v.
United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1120 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051
(1978). The court noted, however, that these rates were 1 to 2 points higher than long term
corporate bond yields, id at 1122, and that the rate of delay compensation awarded from
1956 through 1960 was "higher than the prime rates and the rates at which the Government
could then have borrowed money." Id at 1124.
127. Id at 1120.
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was the same 6% rate prescribed by the Declaration of Taking Act in
1931.121 After 1937, the rate dropped to 5%129 and remained at that
level until 1944 when the rate dropped again to 4%. The 4% figure
remained stable until it was successfully challenged in 1976.130 It is
interesting to note that while the rate of delay compensation employed
by the Court of Claims underwent several changes, the 6% rate speci-
fied by the Declaration of Taking Act remained unchanged.
As noted above, the 4% rate of delay compensation awarded by the
Court of Claims in 1944 remained unchanged for over thirty years.
This stagnation of the interest rate occurred "not because of any affirm-
ative determination that ...an increase was improper or unwar-
ranted, but rather because [the Court of Claims] was not confronted
with a case that presented the necessary evidence properly."' 131 Almost
immediately after the Blankinshio opinion was handed down, a suc-
cessful challenge to the 4% rate of delay compensation was made in
Pitcairn v. United States."'32 Pitcairn involved infringement by the
United States of various patents held by the Autogiro Company, cover-
ing helicopter rotor structures and control systems. In that case, the
first taking by patent infringement occurred in 1946.133 That date
marked the point from which delay compensation began to run. The
Court of Claims did not render final judgment until March 1977.1
31
Although Autogiro's right to delay compensation did not cease until
final payment by the United States, the 1977 date illustrates the tre-
128. See id and text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
129. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1120 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978). The prime rate was 1.5% during the same period. 1 J. FINAN-
CIAL PLAN. 91 (1977).
130. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1120 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978); Tektronix, Inc. v. United States 552 F.2d 343, 353 n.18 (Ct. Cl.),
modifed, 557 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1977), subsequentl app ealedfrom trial court disposition, 575
F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978).
131. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1124 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978). Cited in Pitcairn in support of this proposition were: Drakes
Bay Land Co. v. United States, 459 F.2d 504, 512 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (erroneously held that the
6% interest paid by the United States in condemnation cases involving land that became part
of the same National Park was interest on the judgments, not interest as a part of delay
compensation); Amerace Esna Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 1377, 1381 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (no
evidence offered to justify requested 6% rate); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v.
United States, 437 F.2d 458, 460 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (evidence offered to justify 6% rate was not
timely offered); Carlstrom v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 245, 250 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (no special
circumstances present to warrant the application of a rate other than the customary one of
4%).
132. 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1978).
133. Id. at 1115.
134. Id. at 1106.
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mendous length of time for which Autogiro was entitled to claim delay
compensation. Thus, arriving at the correct standard for computing in-
terest rates becomes an extremely critical factor in such cases.
In Pitcairn, both the United States and Autogiro urged that the 4%
rate, applied since 1944, should not be applied in that case. The United
States suggested that the trial judge arrive at a rate of delay compensa-
tion by considering the yields on hypothetical long term government
bonds that had been constructed solely for the purpose of the litiga-
tion.1 35 Autogiro urged that the court use Moody's Composite Index of
Yields on Long Term Corporate Bonds. 136
The trial judge found that the Government's hypothetical bonds
would yield 3.1% per annum from the time of taking until final pay-
ment. He found this rate of delay compensation to be "both inade-
quate and improper."'' 37  Examination of the trends indicated by
Moody's Composite Index of Yields on Long Term Corporate Bonds
led the trial judge to break down the time of delay into several periods
and to assign different interest rates to each period. The interest rates
determined by the trial judge ranged from a low of 4% for the years
1947 through 1955 to a high of 7.5% for the years 1971 through 1975. 13
As justification for his decision to use Moody's Bond Index as a
measure to determine delay compensation, the trial judge relied on sec-
tion 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code.' 39 This section provides for
135. Id. at 1120.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1122 n.18.
138. Id at 1121. The rates established by the trial judge were as follows: 4% for the
period 1947-1955, 4.5% for 1956-1960, 4.75% for 1961-1965, 6.5% for 1966-1970, and 7.5%
for 1971-1975. The actual yields indicated in Moody's Composite Index for these periods
are: 3.1% for the period 1947-1955, 4.26% for the period 1956-1960, 4.6% for the period
1961-1965, 6.7% for the period 1966-1970, and 8.3% for the period 1971-1975. U.S. DEP'T
COM., ANN. STATISTICAL DIG. 105 (21st biennial ed. 1977).
139. I.R.C. § 6621 provides:
(a) In general.-
The rate of interest. . . is 9 percent per annum, or such adjusted rate as is estab-
lished by the Secretary under subsection (b).
(b) Adjustment of interest rate.-
The Secretary shall establish an adjusted rate of interest for the purpose of subsec-
tion (a) not later than October 15 of any year if the adjusted prime rate charged by
banks during September of that year, rounded to the nearest full percent, is at least a
full percentage point more or less than the interest rate which is then in effect. Any
such adjusted rate of interest shall be equal to the adjusted prime rate charged by
banks, rounded to the nearest full percent, and shall become effective on February 1
of the immediately succeeding year. An adjustment provided for under this subsec-
tion may not be made prior to the expiration of 23 months following the date of any
preceding adjustment under this subsection which changes the rate of interest.
In his dissent, 547 F.2d at 1128-30 (Skelton, J., concurring and dissenting), Judge Skelton
disapproved of the use of I.R.C. § 6621, stating:
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the payment of 9% interest by the government on overpayments of fed-
eral taxes and allows for annual adjustment of that rate when the prime
rate is a full point more or less than the interest rate then in effect.t40
The significance of this Internal Revenue Code section to the decision
to use Moody's Index, as seen by the trial judge, was that "Congress
thus gives statutory sanction to the use of a commercial rate index or
indicator in determining the rate of interest to be paid by the Govern-
ment." 141
In a supplement to the trial judge's opinion, 142 the Court of Claims
affirmed the use of Moody's Composite Index of Yields on Long Term
Corporate Bonds as a basis for the determination of the proper rate of
delay compensation. 143 In so holding, the court stated:
[L]ong-term corporate bond yields are an indicator of broad trends and
relative levels of investment yields or interest rates. They cover the
broadest segment of the interest rate spectrum. The corporate bond mar-
ket is large, substantially in excess of long-term Government bonds and
long-term corporate yields measure basic trends and relative levels of in-
terest rates from one period to another."4
The Court of Claims agreed with the trial judge's rejection of the
hypothetical long term government bonds as the measure for determin-
ing delay compensation. 145 The court found these bonds, although rep-
resentative of the cost to the United States of borrowing money, to be
irrelevant in measuring the injury caused to Autogiro by the delay in
There is not the slightest evidence or indication that Congress intended the Act to apply
in any way to eminent domain cases. Besides, there is a big difference between interest
on an overpayment of taxes and interest in a taking case. An overpayment of taxes
allows the Government to use the taxpayer's money until a refund is made and the nine
percent interest is payment by the Government for such use. Whereas, in a taking case,
interest is not paid for use of the money belonging to the party whose property is taken,
but is awarded to him as a part of his damages in the form of delayed compensation.
Id. at 1130. Judge Skelton did not correctly analyze the proposition for which the trial judge
cited I.R.C. § 6621. The trial judge merely used this section as support for the proposition
that Congress, in adjusting the interest rate, gave sanction to the use of economic indicators
for determining the rate of interest to be paid by the government. See note 141 infra and
accompanying text. As the rate specified by I.R.C. § 6621 was designed to reflect the pre-
vailing prime interest rate, see I.R.C. § 6621(b) supra, it is a satisfactory guide for determin-
ing the rate of delay compensation. However, it should be considered in conjunction with
other indicators, as it only reflects the rate at which the most favored borrowers may borrow
money. See 547 F.2d at 1124. The prime interest rate was also one of the factors utilized by
the trial court to determine delay compensation on remand in United States v. Blankinship,
431 F. Supp. 403, 404 (D. Or. 1977).
140. See I.R.C. § 6621, supra note 139.
141. 547 F.2d at 1121.
142. Id. at 1122 n.17.
143. Id. at 1124.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1122, 1124.
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compensation.' 46 The Pitcairn court attempted to harmonize this view
with the Blankinshio holding by differentiating between the long term
hypothetical bonds and the actual, shorter term, United States Treas-
ury notes utilized in Blankinshp.'47 The Court of Claims also accu-
rately pointed out that the trial judge in Blankinshio was not bound by
those rates, but merely had to consider them. t48 The court further
stated that the trial judge had taken the actual yields on those bonds
"into account."' 49 The court did not say, nor is there any other evi-
dence, that the trial judge actually used these Treasury notes in his de-
termination of the rate of delay compensation.
Implicit in the selection of Moody's Index as the proper measure of
delay compensation by both the trial judge and the Court of Claims is
the rejection of the use of United States Treasury notes as suggested by
the Blankinship court. Whether measured by hypothetical or actual
government bonds, the result is the same: "[C]ompensation [is deter-
mined] only according to the point of view of the taker without refer-
ence to that of the owner since he is hardly likely to be able to borrow
money at the rates the Government can."' 5 As discussed above, this
method of valuation contravenes the compensatory purpose of the law
of eminent domain.'
5 '
The Pitcairn court also rejected the notion that the rate of delay com-
pensation could be based either in whole or in part on the actual cost to
the condemnee of borrowing money.'5 2 The court's rationale was that
condemnees are not usually in the business of borrowing money; there-
fore, delay compensation based on such costs is too speculative.1
3
As the Court of Claims found the cost of borrowing money to either
the condemnor or the condemnee to be unacceptable, it focused upon
Moody's Index as a compromise between the two competing theories.
146. Id. at 1122. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
147. 547 F.2d at 1122 n.18. The court stated that Blankinshop "dealt with relatively short-
term, actual Treasury securities-not with hypothetical long-term Government bonds never
actually issued." Id.
148. Id. See note 104 supra and accompanying text,
149. 547 F.2d at 1122 n.18. In his dissent, Judge Skelton disagreed, stating:
It does not appear that there was any evidence at the trial showing the rate of interest
that would have been available to the plaintiff if it had invested, on the dates of taking,
the total amounts due it in marketable public debt securities issued by the United States
Treasury during the periods involved here. Without such evidence, we are not justified
in awarding interest of more than six percent. ...
Id. at 1130 (Skelton, J., concurring and dissenting).
150. Id. at 1122.
151. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
152. 547 F.2d at 1123-24.
153. Id.
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The court was impressed by the breadth of the corporate bond market
and by the fact that Moody's Index covers the broadest segment of the
interest rate spectrum. In choosing Moody's Index, the Court of
Claims implicitly indicated that the prevailing or fair market interest
rate should determine delay compensation. For, as Moody's Index
covers a large segment of the interest rate spectrum, it indicates the
average market cost of borrowing money.
In a later patent infringement case, Tektronix, Inc. v. United
States,'54 the Court of Claims reiterated its preference for Moody's
Composite Index of Yields on Long Term Corporate Bonds.'55 In Tek-
tronix, the infringement period began in 1959,156 thus entitling the
owner of the infringed patents, Tektronix, to delay compensation from
that date until final payment. The trial judge did not apply the interest
rates established in Pitcairn for the applicable periods, but established
new rates to apply to Tektronix.'57 He based the determination of de-
lay compensation on the yields of Aaa corporate bonds and actual
Treasury securities.'58
The Court of Claims reversed the decision of trial judge, holding that
the Pitcairn rates were to be automatically applied to just compensation
cases without any need of proof on an individual case basis. 59 How-
ever, as Pitcairn only considered interest rates through 1975, the Tek-
tronix court held that the presumption of 7.5% interest could be
overcome for those years after 1975 if an appropriate showing were to
be made.' 60 The court further held that such a showing had to be made
in a manner consistent with the theory developed in Pitcairn.16 ' The
only reasonable inference that can be drawn from this requirement is
that, since the Pitcairn theory of delay compensation was based on
154. 552 F.2d 343 (Ct. Cl.), modifled, 557 F.2d 265 (Ct. C1. 1977), subsequently appealed
from trial court disposition, 575 F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978).
155. 552 F.2d at 352-53.
156. Id. at 345. But see id. at 352 (indicating a 1960 commencement date).
157. Id. at 352 & n.16.
158. Id. at 352.
159. Id. See note 138 supra for the rates established in Pitcairn.
160. 552 F.2d at 352. In a subsequent decision based upon the Tektronix litigation, Tek-
tronix, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978), the
Court of Claims affirmed the trial judge's implementation of a delay compensation rate of
8% to be applied from January 1, 1976 until payment. Id. at 836. In affirming the 8% rate,
the court harmonized its holding with Pitcairn, stating that "it should be noted that the
Pitcairn opinion focused solely on the period before 1976. Although the 7 percent rate [in
Pitcairn] was ultimately applied to a period extending beyond 1975, the Pitcairn opinion,
and our 1977 opinion in this case, left the door open for proof that a different rate should be
applied in years after 1975." Id.
161. 552 F.2d at 352-53.
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Moody's Composite Index of Yields on Long Term Corporate Bonds,
all delay compensation in the future should also be based on Moody's
Corporate Index.
The Tektronix opinion, in rejecting the trial court's use of Aaa cor-
porate bonds and actual Treasury securities, further demonstrates the
Court of Claim's disapproval of the utilization in Blankinshio of actual
Treasury securities to determine delay compensation. Although the
court in Pitcairn attempted to reconcile its decision with Blankinshp,
no such attempt was made in Tektronix. The Tektronix opinion, how-
ever, did not purport to pass upon delay compensation cases pursuant
to statutes in which Congress has established a "different rate."' 62
The court's disclaimer notwithstanding, both Tektronix and Pitcairn
should stand for the proposition that interest at less than the prevailing
market rate does not meet the constitutional requirement of just com-
pensation for delay in payment to the condemnee. Just compensation
is not a statutory determination.'63 Nor is it determined by the proce-
dural remedy employed. The proposition that delay compensation, or
the entire award for that matter, differs depending upon the procedure
of the court hearing the case is ludicrous. The only rational explana-
tion for the court's disclaimer is that it was an attempt to dismiss the
dissent's contention that the court's adoption of the Pitcairn rates of
delay compensation "amount[ed] to legislation that can only be enacted
by Congress."'"
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF Blankinshio AND THE COURT OF CLAIMS
CASES WHEN APPLIED To STATE LAW
The holding in Blankinshio, as expanded by the Court of Claims in
Pitcairn and Tektronix, is especially significant in light of the recent
upward surge of interest rates. At the time Blankinship was decided,
the prime interest rate had settled back to 6.75%.165 However, by April
1978, when the Court of Claims decided the final Tektronix case, the
rate had climbed back up to 8%. 66 In the nine month period since
Tektronix, the prime rate has reached 11.75%. 167 These statistics
162. Id. at 353 n.19.
163. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
164. 552 F.2d at 355 (Skelton, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Skelton contended
that the majority, by holding that the Picairn rates were to apply from then on, had usurped
Congress' legislative powers. This contention is easily defeated because the issue of just
compensation is one to be determined by the judiciary, and not the legislature.
165. 1 J. FINANCIAL PLAN. 93 (1977).
166. 64 FED. RaS. BULL. A26 (Sept. 1978).
167. Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1979, at 29, col. 5.
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clearly demonstrate that interest at 6% cannot possibly constitute just
compensation at a time when the most secure borrowers have to pay
almost double that amount.
Even in light of these developments in the federal courts and the
money market, many states continue to pay delay compensation at a
rate of 6% or less.168 Although the states are not bound by Blankinship
or the decisions of the Court of Claims, they are required by the United
States Constitution 69 to pay just compensation for property taken by
the exercise of their powers of eminent domain. 170 As just compensa-
tion is determined by what the owner has lost, and not by the identity
of the taker, the principles developed in Blankinship, as supplemented
by Tektronix and Pitcairn, have clear constitutional impact on state
procedures for determining delay compensation.
The principles developed in these cases are most beneficially applied
if considered in conjunction with one another. First, Blankinshio
should be viewed as standing primarily for the proposition that statu-
tory interest rates operate only as a floor for delay compensation, al-
though the Constitution may require greater compensation. This
enables a state statute to remain constitutional on its face, while al-
lowing for a greater rate of compensation if required by the fourteenth
amendment. The determination of whether a greater rate of interest is
required is one made by the trier of fact.
Next, application of the principles set forth in Pitcairn and Tektronix
provides a model to be used by the trial court in making the determina-
tion of whether a greater interest rate is required. The trier of fact
should examine the trend in investment yield rates. As indicated in
Pitcairn, this is easily accomplished by analyzing one or more of the
indices assembled for this purpose. If the applicable statute allows for
a greater rate, then the statutory rate should be applied. If the statutory
rate is substantially less than the market rate, then the principles of just
compensation require application of that market rate to determine a
constitutionally just delay compensation.
Mark A Kaplan
168. See cases cited in note 78 supra.
169. U.S.CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
170. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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